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 INDEPENDENCE V. ACCOUNTABILITY: 
FINDING A BALANCE AMIDST THE 
CHANGING POLITICS OF STATE-COURT 
JUDICIAL SELECTION 
THE HONORABLE DIANE S. SYKES

 
This year’s contest for a pivotal seat on our state supreme court was 
unusual for Wisconsin, and not just because, for the first time in forty-one 
years, an incumbent justice was unseated.  The election was predominated—
some might say overwhelmed—by millions of dollars in saturation 
advertising on television, much of which was crass, misleading, and at times 
utterly inconsistent with the judicial role.  Most of these ads were sponsored 
by third-party interest groups operating independently for or against the 
candidates, although one particularly base and deceptive attack ad was 
sponsored by the campaign of the victorious challenger.  The candidate 
debates were generally unilluminating because the questions tended to focus 
on the subject of the negative advertising, as did much of the newspaper 
coverage of the race.  Justice Louis Butler, who was defeated by Burnett 
County Circuit Judge Michael Gableman, did not himself engage in this sort 
of advertising, to his credit and the credit of the judicial office he will soon 
relinquish. 
This election, together with last year’s (which had some of the same 
characteristics), has set off a debate about whether our system of judicial 
selection is broken, and if so, what should be done to fix it.  Some—including 
all seven sitting justices of the supreme court—have strongly advocated 
campaign finance reform, including substantial public funding of supreme 
court campaigns.
1
  Others suggest doing away with judicial elections 
altogether.  The Wisconsin State Journal editorialized in favor of replacing 
supreme court elections with so-called ―merit selection‖ of supreme court 
justices.
2
  The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel also endorsed the appointment of 
 

This speech was presented during the Eastern District of Wisconsin Bar Association’s annual 
meeting on April 17, 2008, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  It has been updated for publication. 

Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
1. See Letter from Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson et al., Supreme Court of Wis. (Dec. 10, 
2007), http://www.wicourts.gov/news/archives/2007/docs/campaignfinanceletter.pdf.  
2. Editorial, For Supreme Court: Merit Reform; The Butler-Gableman Campaign Has 
Demonstrated How Money and Politics Have Tainted Wisconsin’s Supreme Court Elections, WIS. 
ST. J., Mar. 23, 2008, at B3. 
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justices after taking up the ―elect or appoint‖ debate in the Sunday opinion 
section.
3
  In a forum in the paper’s ―Crossroads‖ section, State Representative 
Fred Kessler promoted his proposal for a constitutional amendment that 
would replace supreme court elections with a system based on the federal 
model, only somewhat modified; he proposed that justices be appointed by the 
governor, confirmed by the state senate, and automatically reappointed after a 
ten-year term unless a supermajority of the senate votes against 
reappointment.
4
  Representative Kessler argued that shifting to an appointed 
supreme court would curb the ―outlandish amounts of money‖ spent by 
outside interest groups on high-court elections and preserve the public’s 
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.
5
 
Marquette Law School Professor Rick Esenberg argued the other side.
6
  
He maintained that judicial elections are imperfect but preferable to the 
alternatives and ought to be retained.
7
  He acknowledged that an appointment 
system may better serve the interest of impartiality, but said protecting that 
interest would come ―at the expense of accountability.‖8  He also noted that 
appointment doesn’t eliminate the politics, ―it just moves it from the 
campaign trail to the hearing room and, of course, the back room.‖9  The 
pitched partisan battles over nominees to the United States Supreme Court—
and some lower federal-court nominees as well—are evidence of that. 
It is not my purpose nor is it appropriate for me to comment more 
specifically on the results of the recent supreme court election or the calls for 
campaign finance reform that have come in its wake.  However, I do have 
substantial personal familiarity with both the appointment and election models 
of judicial selection, having navigated a contested countywide circuit court 
race, a gubernatorial appointment to a mid-term vacancy on the state supreme 
court, a contested statewide election for a full term on the court, and the 
federal nomination and confirmation process for my present position on the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  After my campaign for the supreme court 
in 2000, I gave a series of speeches to law students and civic groups 
defending judicial elections.  It has become increasingly difficult to do so, but 
 
3. Editorial, Appointing Justices: After Two Nasty Campaigns that Have Harmed the 
Credibility of Wisconsin’s Highest Court, It’s Time to Change the Way that the State Selects Justices , 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 16, 2008, at 10A. 
4. Frederick P. Kessler, Op-Ed., Elect or Appoint? To Maintain Integrity, Appoint Justices, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 2008, at 1J. 
5. Id. 
6. Rick Esenberg, Op-Ed., Elect or Appoint? Judicial Elections Are an Imperfect, Best Option, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 2008, at 1J. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
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as Professor Esenberg observed, the alternatives have their flaws too.  If we 
are about to have a public discussion on the subject of judicial selection—and 
I think we should—a little historical perspective might be useful. 
We have been debating the issue of judicial selection for more than 200 
years.  At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, there was a 
debate over the establishment of inferior federal courts, including the subject 
of who should appoint the judges of the lower federal courts—Congress or the 
President.
10
  James Wilson of Pennsylvania argued in favor of presidential 
appointment, as with the Supreme Court, in order to avoid the ―intrigue, 
partiality and concealment‖ that would attend appointment by the legislative 
body.
11
  John Rutledge of South Carolina strongly disagreed, arguing that 
―[t]he people . . . will think we are leaning too much towards monarchy.‖12  
Catherine Drinker Bowen, in her classic Miracle at Philadelphia, describes 
how the impasse was broken: 
 
As the debate mounted, Dr. Franklin interposed mildly.  
Only two modes of choosing the judges, he said, had so far 
been mentioned; it was a point of great moment and he 
wished other modes might be suggested.  He would like to 
mention one which he understood was practiced in Scotland.  
He then [according to an account contained in James 
Madison’s notes], ―in a brief and entertaining manner related 
a Scotch mode, in which the nomination proceeded from the 
lawyers, who always selected the ablest of the profession in 
order to get rid of him, and share his practice among 
themselves.‖  Here in America, on the other hand, it was the 
interest of the electors to make the best choice.
13
 
 
The author continues: 
 
[W]hen this particular old man told a story it was impossible 
not to be diverted.  Madison moved that in the ninth Resolve 
the words ―appointment by the legislature‖ be struck out, and 
a blank left ―to be hereafter filled on maturer reflection.‖  In 
[the] Committee of the Whole the states voted, approving 
nine to two.
14
 
 
 
10. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 65 (1966). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 66. 
14. Id. 
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The framers of the Federal Constitution, of course, opted for presidential 
appointment for all federal judges, with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
and lifetime tenure in good behavior.  This was thought to be the mode of 
judicial selection most conducive to the independence of the judiciary and the 
preservation of the rule of law.  Alexander Hamilton described the rationale 
for presidential appointment and lifetime tenure in The Federalist No. 78: 
 
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the 
bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative 
encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong 
argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since 
nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent 
spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful 
performance of so arduous a duty. 
 
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to 
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the 
effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men or 
the influence of particular conjunctures sometimes 
disseminate among the people themselves; and which, though 
they speedily give place to better information and more 
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to 
occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and 
serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the 
Constitution and of individuals, which we perceive to be 
indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be 
expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary 
commission.  Periodical appointments, however regulated or 
by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal 
to their necessary independence.  If the power of making 
them was committed either to the Executive or [the] 
legislature, there would be danger of an improper 
complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, 
there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of 
either; if to the people or to persons chosen by them for the 
special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to 
consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be 
consulted but the Constitution and the laws.
15
 
 
15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 230–31, 232 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d. 
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At the time of the ratification of the Federal Constitution, most state-court 
judges were appointed by one of two methods: legislative appointment or 
gubernatorial appointment subject to legislative confirmation.
16
  The latter 
method was similar to the federal model, although it was considered to be 
substantially more democratic since at that time neither the President nor the 
Senate was directly elected.
17
 
By the time of Andrew Jackson’s presidency, however, concern for 
judicial independence was being replaced by concern for judicial 
accountability.
18
  Jacksonian populism, and its preference for direct 
democracy, took hold.
19
  Insulating judges from political accountability was 
seen as antidemocratic and likely to produce an aristocratic, arbitrary, and 
unresponsive judiciary.
20
 
Mississippi became the first state to provide for the direct election of 
appellate judges in 1832.
21
  Between 1846 and 1860 there were sixteen state 
constitutional conventions; all but two provided for the popular election of 
both appellate- and inferior-court judges.
22
  By the Civil War, most states had 
converted to direct election of state supreme court and lower court judges.
23
  
With the admission of Missouri in 1832 and continuing through 1958, every 
state that entered the Union provided by constitution for an elected judiciary,
24
 
some partisan, some nonpartisan. 
Wisconsin, of course, was among these, achieving statehood in 1848.
25
  
Our entire state judiciary is elected and nonpartisan.  However, Alexander 
Stow, one of the first justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, was utterly 
opposed to an elected judiciary and accepted the position with the promise 
that he would not run for a second term.
26
  He kept his word and left the bench 
after two and a half years of service.
27
 
 
ed. 1966). 
16. Stephen B. Presser et al., Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for Judicial 
Appointments, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 353, 356 (2002). 
17. Id. at 356–57. 
18. Id. at 358. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 359. 
21. Id. at 358. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. PORTRAITS OF JUSTICE: THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT’S FIRST 150 YEARS 1 (Trina E. 
Gray et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
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At least one observer of American democracy saw some danger in the 
shift toward elected judiciaries.  Alexis de Tocqueville noted: 
 
Under some [state] constitutions the judges are elected and 
subject to frequent reelection.  I venture to predict that sooner 
or later these innovations will have dire results and that one 
day it will be seen that by diminishing the magistrates’ 
independence, not judicial power only but the democratic 
republic itself has been attacked.
28
 
 
The Progressive reform movement of the early twentieth century saw the 
development of yet another method of judicial selection, the so-called ―merit 
selection‖ process.29  Motivated by a desire to protect the judiciary from the 
extreme partisanship, cronyism, and corruption that tended to pervade the 
other branches of government, Progressive reformers in bar associations and 
―good government‖ groups pushed a proposal first developed in 1914 by a 
professor at Northwestern University School of Law.
30
 
The proposal called for judicial nominations to proceed from a committee 
of experts, mostly lawyers selected by the organized bar, or some combination 
of the organized bar and the appointing authority (typically the governor).
31
  
The committee would screen candidates and develop a list of finalists for the 
governor, who would then fill judicial vacancies by appointing someone from 
the selection committee’s list.32  The appointee would take office, subject only 
to an up-or-down retention election in the next general election cycle and 
periodic retention elections thereafter.
33
  In theory, the process would be 
nonpartisan, impartial, and merit based, maximizing the role of legal 
professionals who, it was thought, were better equipped than politicians or the 
general public to evaluate the qualifications of potential judges.
34
  The 
retention-election feature of the system was designed to afford some level of 
public accountability.
35
 
Missouri was the first state to adopt the so-called merit-selection method 
of judicial selection in 1940.
36
  For a while no other state followed suit.
37
  
 
28. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 247 (J. P. Mayer & Max Lerner 
eds., George Lawrence trans., 1966). 
29. Presser et al., supra note 16, at 361. 
30. Id. at 360–61. 
31. Id. at 361–62. 
32. Id. at 362. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
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Then, between 1958 and 1976, nineteen states converted to this method of 
judicial selection.
38
  In addition, several others adopted some form of merit 
selection in combination with other methods.
39
  So today, Benjamin 
Franklin’s mischievous suggestion at the constitutional convention that the 
lawyers should choose the judges has in a sense come to pass in 
approximately half the states.  Twenty-one states continue to select judges by 
partisan or nonpartisan direct election.
40
  The rest adhere to the gubernatorial- 
or legislative-appointment model.
41
 
The debate over state-court judicial selection has been rekindled by recent 
trends in state supreme court elections around the country, which have come 
to resemble legislative- and executive-branch elections in their rhetoric and 
expense.  High-court races in many states have become multimillion-dollar 
propositions, with legislative-style rhetoric to match.  Campaigns are 
increasingly run on exaggerated crime-and-punishment templates, to the 
exclusion of any broader discussion of legal philosophy.  Special-interest 
organizations that used to involve themselves only in legislative- or executive-
branch races have become intensely interested in state high-court politics and 
are prepared to spend enormous amounts of money to influence these races.
42
 
Judicial campaigns in Wisconsin have historically suffered from a 
different sort of problem: Most were low-interest affairs in which the 
candidates had relatively modest budgets and limited opportunities to 
communicate with voters about their qualifications, experience, and judicial 
philosophy.  The media paid little attention.  Lawyers and bar associations, 
elected officials, labor organizations, and civic groups like the Rotary, 
Kiwanis, and local men’s, women’s, and senior-citizen clubs were the typical 
stops on the campaign trail.  Paid advertising was important too, but it 
generally stuck to touting the candidate’s experience and endorsements—
especially endorsements from sheriffs and law-enforcement groups, prized for 
their ability to validate the candidate’s law-and-order credentials, which most 
voters look for in a judge.  These ads were typically illustrated by footage of 
courtrooms, gavels, handcuffs, jail cells, and pictures of the candidate talking 
with police officers—not terribly illuminating on the qualities necessary in a 
good judge, but at least not harmful to the public’s understanding of the 
judicial function.  It could reasonably be argued that these old-style judicial 
 
37. Michael DeBow et al., Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for Partisan Judicial 
Elections, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 393, 395 (2002). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial 
Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 278 (2002). 
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elections provided so little information to the voting public as to make judicial 
elections nothing more than meaningless contests over name recognition. 
We are now experiencing the opposite extreme.  Throughout the 1990s, 
we saw increasingly expensive and hard-fought supreme court races 
characterized by sharp rhetoric on hotly contested legal issues and greater 
participation by third-party interest groups.  Still, we managed to avoid the 
bruising, big-money battles over control of our supreme court that many other 
states were experiencing.  Now they have arrived, and I suspect they’re 
probably here to stay. 
This development, I think, is a predictable byproduct of the increased 
litigiousness of our society, the legislative responses to it, and the expanding 
use of the courts to bring about public-policy change.  Special-interest 
combatants in the legislative process increasingly look to the courts to block 
disfavored legislation or to impose their public-policy preferences through 
litigation when they fail to accomplish their objectives through legislation.  
More fundamentally, these costly and rhetorically excessive high-court 
campaigns are a reaction to the struggle going on in state supreme courts 
around the country—ours included—over the proper role of the judiciary and 
the method of legal interpretation best suited to maintaining the balance of 
power between the judiciary and the other branches of government. 
Broadly speaking, it is a struggle between conservative or textualist and 
liberal or purposivist judges.  Labels are tricky, but to generalize, the former 
look to neutral principles and sources of interpretation that operate to limit 
judicial discretion: the text, structure, and history of the state and federal 
constitutions and laws; precedent; and traditional rules of legal interpretation.  
This approach tends to be more restrained in the use of judicial power and 
therefore more sensitive to separation of powers and the prerogatives of the 
other branches of government.  On the other side of the philosophical divide 
are those who subscribe to a more expansive view of the judicial role and see 
the law as a malleable instrument through which judges should try to achieve 
the ―right‖ or ―best‖ or ―just‖ result.  These judges are more inclined to look 
behind the language and structure of the law to discover and implement the 
purpose the judge ascribes to it, more willing to modify traditional interpretive 
methods, and less inclined to defer to the other branches of government.  This 
struggle has obvious consequences for judicial politics. 
To return to The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton famously said that the 
judiciary has ―neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment,‖ and that ―[t]o 
avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should 
be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point 
2008] STATE-COURT JUDICIAL SELECTION 349 
out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.‖43  These ―rules 
and precedents‖ operate as internal constraints on the judges to guard against 
any ―deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature.‖44  The 
Federalists believed that because judges were bound by the requirements of 
traditional judicial method, and because the judiciary had neither purse nor 
sword, only a comparatively weak external check—the possibility of 
impeachment—was necessary to maintain the balance of power.45  Federal 
judges, appointed for life and removable only by impeachment, enjoy the 
highest degree of decisional independence. 
Not so an elected judiciary.  My colleague Judge Posner has written a new 
book called How Judges Think.
46
  I haven’t read the whole book yet, but in the 
opening chapters he discusses (among other things) an economic theory of 
judicial behavior that consists of evaluating the relative strengths of the 
internal and external constraints on judges.
47
  Elections operate as an external 
constraint on state judges’ job performance.  There is no question that this 
weakens judicial independence—that’s the whole point.  Independence and 
accountability are important, but conflicting, values.  In choosing an elected 
judiciary, Wisconsin has accepted a reduction in judicial independence in 
order to achieve a greater level of judicial accountability. 
In the ordinary course, the internal constraints on judges operate to 
prevent this from becoming too great a sacrifice.  Most of the time, judges 
who do not stray too far too fast from the judicial mainstream are reelected, 
often without opposition.  But if the judges start loosening the internal 
constraints on the use of their power by altering the rules of interpretation too 
much or too swiftly—and therefore expanding their own power—the other 
branches of government and those who have an interest in the work of the 
courts will take notice, and the external constraint of the ballot box will kick 
in. 
The price of direct electoral judicial accountability may be too high.  
Judges do not represent constituents, nor do they implement the will of the 
people as other elected officials do.  Professor Esenberg notes the 
countermajoritarian character of some of our most important legal rights—
freedom of speech, for example, and the procedural rights of criminal 
defendants—and is rightly concerned about the possibility that elected judges 
are influenced by the ballot-box consequences of their decisions.
48
  Judges 
 
43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 227, 232–33. 
44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 245 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d. ed. 1966). 
45. Id. 
46. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008). 
47. See generally id. 
48. Esenberg, supra note 6. 
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cannot consult popular opinion in deciding cases but (to use Hamilton’s words 
again) must ―justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the 
Constitution and the laws.‖49  We do not know the extent to which the threat 
of defeat in the next election might inhibit judges from making unpopular 
decisions dictated by law. 
The colossal amount of money now spent on state high-court elections 
also leaves the troubling impression of influence-buying.  I am not suggesting 
there is anything inherently sinister about interest-group participation in 
electoral politics; the people have every right to organize for the purpose of 
influencing elections.  I am also not suggesting that special-interest 
participation in a judicial election means the judge who happened to benefit 
from that participation is ethically compromised.  This is a problem of 
perception more than reality; we are not living in a John Grisham novel, at 
least not in Wisconsin.
50
  Our ethics rules prohibit judges and judicial 
candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions.
51
  Funds are 
raised by the judge’s campaign committee, and contributions are limited in 
size and subject to reporting and other requirements of state campaign finance 
law.
52
  Receipt of a contribution from a lawyer or citizen does not 
automatically disqualify the judge from later hearing a case involving a 
contributing lawyer as counsel or a contributing citizen as litigant.
53
  
However, special-interest spending on state high-court races now far exceeds 
the candidates’ own spending, and the staggering totals have prompted calls 
for new rules governing judicial recusal in cases involving direct contributors 
or third-party interests. 
But remember that candidates for the supreme court have no control over 
the spending of outside interest groups; in Wisconsin coordination between a 
justice’s campaign and third-party organizations is illegal.54  Requiring 
recusal based on conduct over which the candidate has no control is ethically 
unnecessary and could subject the court to gross political manipulation.  
Disqualification decisions on a court of last resort are highly sensitive and 
difficult and sometimes affect the outcome of the case.  The sideshow created 
by the clamor for justices to recuse themselves because of money raised and 
spent during an election
55
 threatens to disrupt the work of the court and 
 
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 232. 
50. See generally JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008). 
51. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(4). 
52. WIS. STAT. §§ 11.06, 11.12, 11.26 (2005–2006). 
53. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.03, 60.04(4), 60.06(4). 
54. WIS. STAT. § 11.06(7). 
55. See, e.g., JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS: SETTING 
RECUSAL STANDARDS (2008), available at 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/1afc0474a5a53df4d0_7tm6brjhd.pdf. 
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undermine the public’s confidence in its decisions.  The United States 
Supreme Court will this term hear a case from West Virginia involving a state 
supreme court justice who cast the deciding vote throwing out a large jury 
verdict against a corporation whose CEO spent $3 million to get that justice 
elected to the court.
56
  More than $500,000 of that total was spent directly on 
advertising in support of the justice’s candidacy; the balance went to a 
special-interest group for the same purpose.
57
 
Finally, the new era ushered in by this year’s election also brings the 
danger that the ongoing, important philosophical clash over the role of the 
state supreme court will simply get lost in the political din.  Crude, negative, 
and sometimes downright dishonest advertising appears to have overtaken our 
judicial elections, which have now descended into the partisan and special-
interest power struggles that other states have experienced.  This phenomenon 
certainly has the potential to exact too great a toll on judicial independence, 
distort the electorate’s understanding of the judicial function, and shake public 
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. 
But no method of judicial selection is perfect; all are prone to 
manipulation and politicization of some sort.  The problem exists in federal 
judicial selection too, which has in some cases pretty much deteriorated into 
raw power politics.  Special-interest coalitions now routinely subject federal 
judicial nominees to ideological litmus tests and distort records and attack 
reputations in order to defeat some nominees. 
We have basically three choices when it comes to picking judges: We can 
have the people do it directly by partisan or nonpartisan election; we can have 
the people do it indirectly by executive or legislative appointment; or we can 
have lawyers do it, in combination with the executive by the so-called merit-
selection approach.  There are a number of problems with having lawyers do 
it.  Merit-selection committees are totally unaccountable, and this method of 
choosing judges promotes a culture in which the bar—instead of the public 
and the rule of law—becomes the primary constituency for any judicial 
aspirant.  The merit-selection committees in some states are susceptible of 
being captured and dominated by the more active and politicized elements of 
the organized bar, and sometimes have an underrepresentation of prosecutors 
and those who represent businesses. 
Having said that, however, there are plenty of drawbacks to judicial 
elections, as I have already noted, and the various proposals for campaign 
finance reform, from public financing to restrictions on independent 
 
56. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. Apr. 3, 2008), 
cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2008) (No. 08-22); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 
2, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. July 2, 2008), 2008 WL 2676568. 
57. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 56, at 7. 
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expenditures, are legally and politically controversial and may create more 
problems than they solve. 
It may be that the recent trends in our supreme court elections will abate.  
It is not impossible to elevate the level of discourse and still articulate the 
philosophical differences that exist between judicial candidates so that the 
public understands what’s at stake.  Drawing these philosophical contrasts 
does not require playing on voters’ fears or hitting them between the eyes 
with images of bloody knives, dead bodies, empty swings, and mug shots of 
child molesters. 
But if these trends continue, and if merit-selection systems are less 
desirable from an accountability standpoint, then it may be that the federal 
model of executive appointment with or without legislative confirmation will 
emerge as the best way to maintain judicial independence, along with at least 
some level of public accountability in the state courts.  Governors, like 
presidents, will be inclined to appoint judges of conservative or liberal judicial 
philosophy, depending upon their own philosophical approaches to 
government, which the voters have explicitly endorsed by electing them to 
office. 
This is not always the case, however, and many a president and governor 
has been surprised by a judicial appointee.  When Chief Justice Roger Taney 
died in 1864, President Lincoln was well aware that the greenback legislation, 
which had been used to finance the Civil War effort, as well as measures 
pertaining to emancipation, would eventually be challenged in the Supreme 
Court.
58
  In deciding on his nominee, Lincoln is reported to have said to a 
confidant:  
 
[W]e wish for a Chief Justice who will sustain what has been 
done in regard to emancipation and the legal tenders.  We 
cannot ask a man what he will do, and if we should, and he 
should answer us, we should despise him for it.  Therefore we 
must take a man whose opinions are known.
59
 
 
Lincoln made what he expected would be a safe choice: Salmon Chase, his 
secretary of the Treasury, who had been the architect of the greenback 
legislation.
60
  Chief Justice Chase wrote the first opinion (later overruled) in 
the so-called ―Legal Tender Cases‖ striking down the greenback legislation as 
 
58. See 2 GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, REMINISCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 29 
(Greenwood Press 1968) (1902). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
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unconstitutional.
61
  On the other hand, President John Adams, who appointed 
the great Chief Justice John Marshall, is reported to have said at his 
retirement, ―John Marshall was my gift to the American people.‖62 
I hope we have not reached the point of needing to overhaul the way we 
select our judges in Wisconsin.  Although I don’t travel around the state as 
much as I used to as a member of the state supreme court, I do not have the 
sense that the people of Wisconsin are so disgusted by our judicial politics 
that they are ready to disenfranchise themselves over the direct selection of 
judges.  Time and circumstances, however, will give us the answer to that 
question. 
 
61. See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625 (1869). 
62. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Supreme Court of the U.S., Remarks at the Federal 
Judges Association 2001 Quadrennial Conference (May 8, 2001), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_05-08-01.html. 
